961 upstream commits since 7bb6c900. Resolutions:
- Test-only conflicts: upstream tests from before the base that our side
cut stay cut; tests new upstream are kept (audio aac/config, layout,
encode_format; cms lutfile; media mux; print windows_native, ticket;
update self_update; xml hostile).
- Code our side moved, with upstream's change carried to the new place:
craft-media mux roll sample groups (mux/boxes.rs) and writer-start
offsets with overflow checks (mux/progressive.rs); craft-print's
shrink-to-fit scale guard (sheets/plan.rs); craft-update's nextest
archive detection (self_update/detect.rs); craft-vectorcraft-format's
Tail::write_to_with (container.rs); craft-i18n's pedantic fixes
(bidi.rs, negotiation.rs).
- craft-ui: the old crate's modules stay removed; gpu_test_lock guarded
their per-test wgpu renderers, which the snapshot kit does not have.
- New upstream tests in crates that build their integration tests into
the library's test executable are modules of tests/main.rs (audio
flac_decode and qoa_oracle, cms, docpath, pcraft-format,
vectorcraft-format).
- The 22 new crates are optional members of the craft facade.
craft-pkcs7
The formats of digital signatures, read, verified and written: what a signed PDF, a signed mail message or a digital ID file is made of.
der: a small BER/DER reader and writer (ITU-T X.690). ATlvborrows from the input and keeps its exact encoding, so a signed structure is verified over the bytes that were signed. Reading is strict DER;parse_beralso takes indefinite lengths and segmented strings, which PKCS #12 files from Windows use. Nesting is bounded.x509: certificates (RFC 5280): names, validity, key, the extensions that matter for signing (basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, key identifiers, OCSP and CRL locations),build_chain/build_chain_noted(issuers that may issue, path length, validity, unprocessed critical extensions),load_certificates(DER, PEM, PKCS #7 bundles),to_pem, andCertificate::self_signed. An extension that is present but unreadable restricts: an unreadable key usage allows no usage, an unreadable extended key usage no purpose.cms: CMS SignedData (RFC 5652):SignedData::parseandverify_signature,sign_detached/sign_encapsulated,certificate_bundle, andattach_timestamp_token.pkcs12:.p12/.pfx(RFC 7292):openreads PBES2 (PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-1/2; AES-CBC or 3DES-CBC) and the legacy PBE schemes (SHA-1 with 3DES or RC2) and checks the MAC, stopping at a fixed amount of key-derivation work;writeuses PBES2 AES-256-CBC with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256.timestamp: RFC 3161 requests, responses and tokens, and a responder for a local stamping identity. No transport:TimestampAuthorityis the caller's.revocation: CRLs (RFC 5280) and OCSP responses (RFC 6960): parsed, their signatures verified, and a certificate's status looked up. Nothing is fetched.keys: digests (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, RIPEMD-160), public keys for verification (RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 and PSS, ECDSA on P-256, P-384, P-521 and the Brainpool curves, Ed25519) and private keys for signing (RSA, P-256, P-384, or a key held elsewhere behindExternalKey).
What a signature means for a document or a message stays with the caller: which bytes it covers, what changed after it, which certificates are trusted, and how a result is worded.
Cryptography
The primitives are RustCrypto's; RSA private-key operations use aws-lc-rs on native targets.
Two things are done in this crate, both verification only and on public data, because no audited
crate offers them: the RSA signature paddings for any digest, MGF1 hash and salt length
(rsa_pad, over the rsa crate's raw public-key operation), and ECDSA on brainpoolP512r1
(ec512, over crypto-bigint). Both are checked against signatures made by OpenSSL.
Weak algorithms are read, not refused, because old signed documents use them:
DigestAlg::weakness and PublicKey::weakness say when one is weak, and the caller decides.
Moved from PdfCraft's pdfcraft-sign.