storytold main 83cb1133dd (291 commits) into the integration head bab1a99b85; 47 conflicted files.
- Domain test files (metafile, prepress, pdf plates, settings store, heif, media-testkit, atomic): tests next cut stay cut; tests new on main are kept, as trials where the crate's test target runs trials.
- atomic: main's group-bits test and Faulty::set_group go to src/tests.rs. audio: main's GSM and SBC oracles join tests/main.rs. cms constructors, pdf knockout_backdrop and testing_pdf join their crates' one test binary; timeline's preflight tests become src/preflight_tests.rs trials.
- update: main's changes to detect, install (linux, macos) and the tests land in next's split modules. The app's own offer is inspected on a thread of its own, picked up by tick's polling; settle_for_tests settles offers too. Later on a ready update drops the close it asked for. updater_pin_tests.rs stays deleted; its new pin test is in tests/it/update.rs.
- craft-color: main added a different crate at crates/color (the colour tags of compositor and display frames); it is next's craft-color module `tags`, re-exported at the root.
- Old crates/ui (combo, docking, testing, README) and keymap's ui/view.rs stay deleted; main's new crates/ui/src/testing files are dropped with them.
- New crates in the craft facade: ai, control, dds, frame, ipc, media-source, palette, press-print, score, ssip. testkit and xtask are listed outside it.
- Cargo.lock: the union of both locks, resolved by cargo metadata. Workflow: main's nextest Windows leg, with next's --keep-going clippy.
craft-pkcs7
The formats of digital signatures, read, verified and written: what a signed PDF, a signed mail message or a digital ID file is made of.
der: a small BER/DER reader and writer (ITU-T X.690). ATlvborrows from the input and keeps its exact encoding, so a signed structure is verified over the bytes that were signed. Reading is strict DER;parse_beralso takes indefinite lengths and segmented strings, which PKCS #12 files from Windows use. Nesting is bounded.x509: certificates (RFC 5280): names, validity, key, the extensions that matter for signing (basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, key identifiers, OCSP and CRL locations),build_chain/build_chain_noted(issuers that may issue, path length, validity, unprocessed critical extensions),load_certificates(DER, PEM, PKCS #7 bundles),to_pem, andCertificate::self_signed. An extension that is present but unreadable restricts: an unreadable key usage allows no usage, an unreadable extended key usage no purpose.cms: CMS SignedData (RFC 5652):SignedData::parseandverify_signature,sign_detached/sign_encapsulated,certificate_bundle, andattach_timestamp_token.pkcs12:.p12/.pfx(RFC 7292):openreads PBES2 (PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-1/2; AES-CBC or 3DES-CBC) and the legacy PBE schemes (SHA-1 with 3DES or RC2) and checks the MAC, stopping at a fixed amount of key-derivation work;writeuses PBES2 AES-256-CBC with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256.timestamp: RFC 3161 requests, responses and tokens, and a responder for a local stamping identity. No transport:TimestampAuthorityis the caller's.revocation: CRLs (RFC 5280) and OCSP responses (RFC 6960): parsed, their signatures verified, and a certificate's status looked up. Nothing is fetched.keys: digests (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, RIPEMD-160), public keys for verification (RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 and PSS, ECDSA on P-256, P-384, P-521 and the Brainpool curves, Ed25519) and private keys for signing (RSA, P-256, P-384, or a key held elsewhere behindExternalKey).
What a signature means for a document or a message stays with the caller: which bytes it covers, what changed after it, which certificates are trusted, and how a result is worded.
Cryptography
The primitives are RustCrypto's; RSA private-key operations use aws-lc-rs on native targets.
Two things are done in this crate, both verification only and on public data, because no audited
crate offers them: the RSA signature paddings for any digest, MGF1 hash and salt length
(rsa_pad, over the rsa crate's raw public-key operation), and ECDSA on brainpoolP512r1
(ec512, over crypto-bigint). Both are checked against signatures made by OpenSSL.
Weak algorithms are read, not refused, because old signed documents use them:
DigestAlg::weakness and PublicKey::weakness say when one is weak, and the caller decides.
Moved from PdfCraft's pdfcraft-sign.